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Abstract EU law incentivises drug marketing authorisation holders (MAHs) to find
new uses for their compounds (research known as ‘‘repositioning’’) by offering them
an extra year of market protection if the new use is authorised. This extra year,
known as the ‘‘?1’’, was enacted on limited evidence, and no study has examined its
effect since it began. Yet, several leading commentators suggest lengthening the
?1. This study assesses the effectiveness of the ?1 by analysing all the relevant
instances of MAHs repositioning their drugs before and after the ?1 came into
effect. The results show that: (i) 42.2% of MAHs repositioned their drugs before the
?1 came into effect, and (ii) once the ?1 did come into effect, it did not increase the
percentage of MAHs that repositioned their drugs. This study finds that the ?1
failed to increase repositioning and then proceeds to consider reform options,
including repealing the law. In doing so, this study takes the first steps towards an
evidence-based policy for the topic.
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1 Introduction
Before a company can market a therapeutic drug in the EEA, the company must
receive a marketing authorisation (MA) from a regulatory authority.1 Companies
that hold MAs are known as marketing authorisation holders (MAHs), and a
company can obtain an EEA-wide MA through one application to the European
Medicines Agency (EMA) via what is called the ‘‘centralised procedure’’.2 If an
MAH then develops a new medical use for its drug, research commonly known as
‘‘repositioning’’, then the MAH must obtain a second MA for the repositioned use
from the EMA.
Repositioning has several advantages over developing new drug compounds.
Perhaps the most noticeable are that it is faster and cheaper.3 Drug industry supplied
data indicate the risk-adjusted average cost of developing a new compound is
around US$1.4 billion,4 whereas drug repositioning is estimated to cost 40 to 90%
less.5 Drug repositioning is typically safer, too, because information already exists
about the drug’s toxicity from clinical trials and clinical use.6 Consequently,
governments and drug companies are attracted to drug repositioning, yet the
situation is not that simple: commentators argue that EU law insufficiently
incentivises it.7
Two intellectual property (IP) regimes incentivise drug repositioning: patents and
regulatory exclusivities.8 Although both regimes provide incentives for reposition-
ing, commentators contend they are insufficient and that reform to either, or both, is
needed.9 Policy developments are challenging, however, because there is a fine line
between exclusive rights that appropriately incentivise innovators and exclusive
rights that unduly restrict competition.
1 Directive (2001/83) on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use [2004] OJ
L311/67, Art. 6(1).
2 Regulation 726/04 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of
medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing the European Medicines Agency
[2004] OJ L136/1, Art. 5(2).
3 Ashburn and Thor (2004), p. 673.
4 DiMasi et al. (2016), p. 26. Though, it should be noted that this figure has been criticised, see e.g.
Prasad and Mailankody (2017), pp. 1570 and 1572–1574.
5 Grabowski and Moe (2008), p. 85; Sahoo (2007), p. 28; Allergan Inc (2011), p. 8; Nosengo (2016),
p. 315; see also DiMasi et al. (2016), pp. 26–27.
6 Oprea and Mestres (2012), p. 759.
7 See e.g. Cordery and Willis (2017), p. 25; Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2. This issue is examined
further in the Background.
8 Regulatory exclusivities are not always thought of as IP, but pharmaceutical law experts typically
classify them as such, see e.g. Feldman (2018), p. 593; Feldman (2016), pp. 54–55; Manley and Vickers
(2015), p. 301.
9 See e.g. Cordery and Willis (2017), p. 27; Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2. This issue is examined
further in the Background.
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This study focuses on drugs authorised via the centralised procedure and
examines the effectiveness of the regulatory exclusivity designed to incentivise
MAHs to reposition their drugs. This incentive is only available for MAHs that
receive a primary MA under Art. 8(3) of Directive 2001/83. Article 8(3) MA
applications are known as ‘‘full self-standing applications’’,10 and must include the
results of clinical trials, amongst other evidence.11 When an MAH initially obtains
an Art. 8(3) MA, it receives 10 years of market protection, and, in brief, if it
repositions the drug within eight years, it is eligible for an extra year of market
protection.12 This extra year of market protection is commonly known in the
industry as ‘‘?1’’.
Market protection holds off competitive pricing by preventing the EMA (and
other European regulatory agencies) from authorising generic and biosimilar
versions of the drugs (collectively referred to as ‘‘generics’’ unless otherwise
indicated).13 Generics have shorter routes to market because the applications to
regulators are based to a large extent on safety and efficacy data generated when the
drug is first authorised.14 The extension of market protection means the MAH can
keep drug prices high for longer, potentially costing governments millions of euros
per year.15 Yet, the introduction of the ?1 was made based on limited evidence,16
and no study has examined its effectiveness since it commenced in 2005.17 A review
of the effectiveness of the regulatory exclusivity is overdue, especially given that
leading commentators have raised the idea of lengthening the exclusivity to enhance
incentives for repositioning.18 The past few decades have also witnessed an increase
in the duration and breadth of regulatory IP rights for drugs in Europe.19
This study assesses the effectiveness of the ?1 by analysing all the instances of
MAHs repositioning their drugs before and after the ?1 came into effect. More
specifically, this study aims to answer whether the ?1 has increased: (i) the
10 Manley and Amos (2015), p. 97.
11 Directive (2001/83), Art. 8(3)(i).
12 Regulation 726/04, Art. 14(11); Directive (2001/83), Arts. 8(3) and 10(1).
13 Directive (2001/83), Art. 10(1).
14 Directive (2001/83), Art. 10(1).
15 Berndt and Aitken (2011), pp. 195–197; United States Food & Drug Administration (2018); Nayroles
(2017), pp. 7–9. The extension of market protection can assist companies’ ‘‘evergreening’’ strategies, but
this is a complex topic that requires careful study, see Lietzan (2019), p. 867.
16 CMS Cameron McKenna and Andersen Consulting (2000), p. 18.
17 Halabi (2018), p. 30. That said, other studies have tackled related but different issues, see e.g.
Langedijk et al. (2016), p. 348.
18 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2; Cordery and Willis (2017), p. 27; Nayroles (2017), pp. 12–13;
Horgan (2018), p. 25.
19 E.g. supplementary patent certificates were introduced in 1992 (Regulation 1768/92 concerning the
creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products [1992] OJ L182/1); and data
protection for drugs was introduced in 1987, which gave Member States the option of providing six or ten
years of protection (Directive 87/21 amending Directive 65/65/EEC on the approximation of provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1987] OJ
L15/36, Art. 1(iii)). This system of data protection was replaced in 2005 with eight years of data
protection and two years of market protection, which was compulsory in all Member States (Regulation
726/04, Art. 14(11)).
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proportion of drugs repositioned by MAHs, or (ii) the number of times drugs are
repositioned by MAHs, as drugs are often repositioned more than once. A drug is
counted for the purposes of this study if an MAH obtained a primary MA under
Art. 8(3) (or antecedent legislation) via the centralised procedure. And a drug is
counted as repositioned if the new use was authorised within eight years of the
primary MA. The eight-year period is one of the eligibility criteria for the ?1.
This paper is organised as follows. The first part provides background on drug
repositioning and IP regimes, including detail on regulatory exclusivities, patent
law, and drug authorisation processes. The second part describes how this study
assembled and sorted drug authorisation data. The third part analyses the data,
showing that repositioning did not increase after the ?1 came into effect. The fourth
part addresses the policy implications flowing from this study. Contrary to
commentators’ opinions, this study does not find evidence indicating the EU should
lengthen the ?1. To conclude, this paper describes additional research to determine
the appropriate policy response, including whether the ?1 should be repealed; a
plausible proposal based on this study’s findings that the ?1 did not increase
repositioning.
2 Background and Study Aims
2.1 Terminology
The terminology used to describe research on new uses of known drugs varies and
can be confusing.20 This study uses the term repositioning in a specific way,
referring to the development of new uses, or more technically, new medical
indications, for already authorised drugs. The ?1 is only available for MAHs that
already hold an MA for a drug; thus, this study focusses only on repositioning by
MAHs. By contrast, drug ‘‘rescuing’’ is often used to describe developing a drug for
an indication after the drug was unsuccessfully developed for a different indication.
This study does not address rescuing.
2.2 Regulatory Exclusivities
The prospect of selling government-authorised drugs in a competitive marketplace
without IP is generally regarded as an insufficient incentive for drug development
because competitors might copy the innovator’s product and sell it at a cheaper
price, having incurred fewer development costs. Regulatory exclusivities and
patents award developers exclusive rights to market drugs for a period of time,
thereby improving the economic incentives.
This study evaluates the effectiveness of the ?1 by comparing the effect of the
current regulatory regime with the regime it replaced. Therefore, it is necessary to
describe the replaced regime: Art. 4(8)(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65 provided 10 years
of data protection for all products authorised by the EMA through the centralised
20 For an overview, see Langedijk et al. (2015), p. 1027.
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procedure when it began in 1995.21 This system continued under Directive
2001/83,22 which superseded Directive 65/65, and did not include an exclusivity for
repositioning.23
Regulation 726/2004, which ushered in the current regulatory regime, introduced
various changes.24 First, Art. 14(11) replaced the 10 years of data protection with
eight years of data protection that runs concurrently with 10 years of market
protection. ‘‘Data protection’’ (commonly called ‘‘data exclusivity’’) refers to a time
period in which competitors cannot apply for authorisations of generics.25 Market
protection (commonly called ‘‘market exclusivity’’) is different; it refers to a time
that competitors can obtain authorisations of generics, but the generic cannot be
placed on the market until the market protection concludes.26
Regulation 726/2004 also introduced an extension to market protection for
repositioning. Article 14(11) states that market protection
shall be extended to a maximum of 11 years if, during the first eight years of
those ten years, the marketing authorisation holder obtains an authorisation for
one or more new therapeutic indications which, during the scientific
evaluation prior to their authorisation, are held to bring a significant clinical
benefit in comparison with existing therapies.
The exclusivity periods described by Regulation 726/2004 are commonly known
by the formula ‘‘8?2(?1)’’,27 which this study adopts, but this formula requires an
explanation to avoid confusion. The ?2 refers to the 10-year market protection and
‘‘2’’ is used instead of ‘‘10’’ because it is pointing to the fact that market protection
eclipses data protection by two years. The ?1 refers to the extra year of market
protection for repositioning, however, it should be noted that the ?1 is not
automatically granted like data protection and market protection. Rather, MAHs
must apply for the ?1 when they submit their application to reposition a drug,
including information on how the drug meets the ‘‘significant clinical benefit’’
test.28
A common perception of repositioning is that it involves the authorisation of a
drug to treat a second disease or condition. However, this view is too narrow.
21 Directive 65/65 on the approximation of provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative
Action relating to proprietary medicinal products [1965] OJ 369/22, Art. 4(8)(a)(iii); Manley and
Strachan (2015), p. 258.
22 Directive (2001/83), Art. 10(1)(a)(iii) (repealed).
23 R. v The Medicines Control Agency (C-368/96) EU:C:1998:583; [1998] E.C.R. I-7967; [1999] 2
C.M.LR. 181 at [38]–[53].
24 The regulatory exclusivities are mirrored in Directive (2001/83), Art. 10(1).
25 Regulation 726/04, Art. 14(11); Directive (2001/83), Art. 10(1); European Commission (2015), p. 39.
Article 14(11) also removed the option for Member States to choose the duration of market exclusivity,
meaning some Member States now provided lengthened market protection. This lengthened market
protection may have increased repositioning at the Member State level.
26 European Commission (2015), pp. 39–40.
27 See e.g. Manley and Strachan (2015), p. 259; European Medicines Agency, Generic and Hybrid
Medicines, p. 15.
28 See generally European Commission (2007), pp. 5–6; European Commission (2006), p. 16.
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Authorised indications are often limited by factors such as age, disease severity or
duration of treatment,29 and the EMA defines ‘‘new therapeutic indication’’ in
Art. 14(11) to mean any expanded use of an authorised drug. Consequently, MAHs
can obtain the ?1 for repositioning that, for example, expands the age range of
patients who have the same condition.30
2.3 Patents
The issue of whether the ?1 has incentivised drug repositioning has gained
prominence in recent years. This prominence is due to many experts, including
practising lawyers, scientists, academics and a former judge, arguing that patents
insufficiently incentivise it. They argue that patents for repositioned indications,
commonly known as ‘‘second medical use’’ patents,31 can be: (i) impossible to
obtain; (ii) difficult to obtain; (iii) possibly invalid and therefore prone to
revocation; and (iv) difficult to enforce.32
Patents for repositioned drugs are impossible or difficult to obtain because of the
requirements that patent applications must meet to be granted and avoid revocation.
Patents are only valid for novel inventions (not previously available to the public).33
Consequently, patents for repositioned drugs might be impossible or difficult to
obtain, or revocable, because treating the new indication is already described in
scientific literature.34 Another requirement for a valid patent is that the invention
involves an inventive step,35 which requires that the invention is not obvious based
on prior knowledge available to the public.36 However, it is not always clear
whether a repositioned use is inventive in light of the existing science.37 Thus, it
might be impossible or difficult to obtain a valid patent.
A third challenge for the validity of a new use patent is that sufficient information
must be disclosed in the patent application at the date it is filed. The European
Patent Office and various contracting states to the European Patent Convention
29 See generally European Medicines Agency (2019), Wording of Therapeutic Indication.
30 European Commission (2007), p. 4. For the purposes of this study, repositioning is limited to instances
when the wording of an indication is changed.
31 For a history on these patents, see Bostyn (2016b), pp. 205–209; Fisher (2017), p. 574.
32 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2; Cordery and Willis (2017), p. 27; Lietzan (2018), pp. 182–191;
Eisenberg (2005), pp. 720–725; Halabi (2018), pp. 24–25; Pushkapom (2018), pp. 50–51.
33 European Patent Convention (1973), Art. 54.
34 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2; Eisenberg (2005), p. 724; Roin (2009), pp. 517–531; Pushkapom
(2018), pp. 50–51.
35 European Patent Convention (1973), Art. 56.
36 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2; Eisenberg (2005), p. 724; Roin (2009), pp. 531–545; Pushkapom
(2018), pp. 50–51.
37 Roin (2009), pp. 544–545.
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require that patent applications provide evidence showing that the drug could
plausibly treat the indication.38 This raises two problems. The first is that patent
applications with insufficient data will be refused and, if a patent is granted, a
competitor could successfully invalidate it.39 The second problem is that generating
this evidence may take significant time, during which the drug might be disclosed in
scientific literature (meaning the patent is no longer novel) or the science advances
to the point where the treatment is obvious (meaning the patent no longer involves
an inventive step).40
The difficulty of enforcing patents has been described as probably the most
important topic affecting repositioning.41 The issue results from the intersection of
the scope of protection for second medical use claims and the way drugs are
patented, manufactured, sold, prescribed, and dispensed, but arises only when a
generic is marketed for an indication other than the repositioned indication, such as
the first known medical use. The difficulty created by the interaction of these facets
of the drug industry begins with the way doctors prescribe drugs.
Doctors commonly prescribe drugs by standardised international non-proprietary
names (INNs), which the World Health Organisation selects.42 Pharmacists then
usually dispense drugs relying on INNs without direct knowledge of patients’
conditions.43 With a generic on the market, pharmacists will have the generic on
their shelf as well as the drug protected by a second medical use patent (commonly
known as a ‘‘branded drug’’). This means that when pharmacists receive an INN
prescription, they, in principle, have a choice between dispensing the generic or the
branded drug.
Labels and packaging information on branded and generic drugs are often
different. A branded drug with an MA for a repositioned use will usually describe
the repositioned indication (as well as the other indications) in its labels and
packaging information, whereas generic drugs typically omit the new use if
protected by a patent (or market protection), a practice known as ‘‘skinny
labelling’’.44 The pharmacist’s choice to dispense a generic or branded drug will be
informed by many factors (e.g. formulation, convenience of dosage) but, like many
choices, cost is often crucial. The mechanisms guiding generic and branded drug
prescription vary between countries and can involve several layers of regulation.45
Breckenridge and Jacob summarise the situation stating ‘‘most countries always
38 Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (2019), 7.2 Level of disclosure required for medical use –
plausibility. Plausibility is not a standalone requirement for a valid patent. Rather, it is a principle that is
relevant to various aspects of different jurisdictions’ patent law, including inventive step, sufficiency and
industrial applicability; for a review, see England (2014), p. 22. Not all Member States have imported the
concept of plausibility but do apply similar criteria, see e.g. Ackermann (2020), pp. 4–5.
39 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2.
40 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2.
41 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2.
42 World Health Organisation (1997).
43 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2; England (2014), pp. 427–431; Warner-Lambert Co LLC v
Generics (UK) Ltd [2019] 3 All ER 95 at [65]–[66].
44 See e.g. Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95 at [8].
45 Bostyn (2016a), pp. 158–160.
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provide a financial incentive to the pharmacists to dispense a (cheaper) generic
medicine when available’’.46 Commentators call the scenario of pharmacists
dispensing generic drugs for indications that are omitted from the labels as ‘‘cross-
label’’ (or ‘‘off-label’’) use,47 and Breckenridge and Jacob argue that the issue is so
significant that ‘‘if a generic version of a drug is available, developers have little or
no opportunity to recoup their investment in the development of the drug for a new
indication’’.48
The challenges to obtaining and enforcing second medical use patents are not
abstract concerns. Appellate courts from across Europe, including from the UK,
Germany, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and others, have
decided cases,49 and the 2018 UK Supreme Court decision Warner-Lambert Co
LLC v Generics (UK) Ltd demonstrates the issues starkly.50 The decision concerned
a second medical use patent for the drug pregabalin. One of the primary claims was
addressed to treating neuropathic pain and the other to treating pain in general (the
drug was first patented for epilepsy).51 The Court invalidated these claims on the
grounds of plausibility.52 The patent showed pregabalin was effective at treating
inflammatory pain in mice, but the Court found the science of pain meant that this
finding did not mean the drug could plausibly treat neuropathic pain or pain in
general.53
Since the patent was found invalid, all the judgments on infringement are obiter.
The Court was split on how to evaluate infringement,54 but three of the five Lords
were of the view that skinny labelling will normally relieve generics of liability for
cross-label use. Lord Sumption, with whom Lord Reed agreed, stated that, if the
patent was valid, it was not infringed by the generic manufacturers’ pregabalin
when sold with a skinny label. They stated that the ‘‘outward presentation’’ of the
packaging meant it was not intended to be manufactured for the patented
purposes.55 Lord Mance generally agreed but added a caveat. He stated that skinny
labelling would ‘‘normal[ly]’’ absolve a generic company of liability,56 but also
stated that ‘‘there might be some circumstances in which a generic manufacturer
could or should be expected to go further, by a notice positively excluding the
patent-protected use’’.57
46 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2; see also Bostyn (2016a), pp. 158–160; Cordery and Willis
(2017), p. 26; Liddicoat (2015), p. 174; Lietzan (2018), pp. 183–192; Pushkapom (2018), p. 51.
47 Cordery and Willis (2017), p. 26; Lunze (2014).
48 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2.
49 See generally Bühling (2016).
50 Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95.
51 Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95 at [4]–[5].
52 Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95 at [17]–[54]
53 Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95 at [50]–[54], [90], [176]–[185], [196].
54 Lords Briggs and Hodge favoured a ‘‘subjective intent test’’, see Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95
at [172]–[174], [188].
55 Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95 at [84]–[86].
56 Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95 at [218].
57 Warner-Lambert [2019] 3 All ER 95 at [213].
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2.4 Study Aims
Commentators have responded to the arguments that repositioning is under-
incentivised by suggesting several types of reform. Some suggest changes to
regulations and guidelines surrounding prescribing and dispensing practices, with
the intention of ensuring only branded drugs are dispensed for repositioned uses.58
Others suggest changes to patent law,59 the creation of special global funds,60 cash
rewards, or ‘‘tradable voucher’’ schemes.61 Commentators have also raised the idea
of lengthening the ?1. Breckenridge and Jacob argue that lengthening the ?1 might
be sensible as it would compensate a company for its expenditure in clinical trials,
even if a patent is unavailable.62
Breckenridge and Jacob’s argument is plausible, but is it supported by evidence?
This study is motivated by that question. Basic capitalist logic suggests that if
society increases market protection for a class of products, then companies will be
more interested in producing those products because the exclusivity will help yield
financial rewards. However, if market protection is too long, the detriments (e.g.
non-competitive pricing) will outweigh the gains from spurring production.
The European Commission designed the ?1 thinking it found the ‘‘right balance’’
between protection and market competition.63 Yet, an EU commissioned report in
2000 (before the?1was introduced) found ‘‘relatively little hard evidence’’ to support
the introduction of a ?1-type exclusivity and none about its duration.64 The lack of
empirical data is a problem given that the justification for the exclusivity assumes that
companies are insufficiently incentivised without it, even though many incentives
exist. These incentives includemarket demand, first-mover advantage, brand power,65
established manufacturer facilities, scientific expertise in the drug, patent rights, and
market protection (remaining from when the drug was first authorised).
Although a dearth of data exists on the ?1, sufficient time has now passed to
examine the effectiveness of the law to achieve the stated goal of incentivising drug
repositioning. The EMA began in 1995,66 providing the first opportunity for
companies to obtain EEA-wide MAs, and the ?1 came into effect on 20 November
2005. The ?1 is only available to drugs with submission dates for primary (not
repositioned) MAs after this date.67 This means the efficacy of the ?1 can be
evaluated by comparing the drugs that were submitted for primary MAs before
58 Cordery (2013), p. 57; Cordery and Willis (2017), p. 28; Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2. For the
US perspective, see Lietzan (2018), pp. 197–209.
59 Jacob (2018), pp. 6–7.
60 Cordery and Willis (2017), p. 27.
61 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2.
62 Breckenridge and Jacob (2019), p. 2. Breckenridge and Jacob make this argument as a complement to
prescription reform.
63 Liikanen (2002).
64 CMS Cameron McKenna and Andersen Consulting (2000), p. 18.
65 O’Connell et al. (2012), p. 54.
66 The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicine Products (1995).
67 Regulation 726/04, Arts. 14(11) and 90.
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20 November 2005 with those submitted after. However, this study is limited to
drugs that received primary MAs up to the end of 2010. Drugs are only counted as
repositioned if the repositioning occurred within eight years of the primary MA, and
drugs that received MAs in 2011 or later are excluded because the eight-year
eligibility period to obtain the ?1 had not elapsed before this study began.
This study aims to answer two specific questions. First, whether the ?1
increased the proportion of drugs repositioned by MAHs; and second, whether the
?1 increased the number of times drugs are repositioned by MAHs, as MAHs
often reposition their drugs more than once. The secondary aim is to generate data
on repositioned drugs across the lifetime of the EMA. The EU currently has no
data on the proportion of MAHs that repositioned their drugs over time, and this
information is key to assessing the extent that other factors incentivise
repositioning.
3 Analysis of EMA Drug Authorisations
3.1 Refining the Cohort of MAs to Analyse
An MAH can reposition a drug for which it holds an Art. 8(3) MA and obtain the
?1 via one of two procedural routes. The first and most common route is by
expanding the extant MA by submitting a type-II variation or an extension
application.68 A key difference between these processes is that extension
applications can include other changes to the pharmaceutical form of the drug
(e.g. tablet, capsules, IV) and route of administration (e.g. injection, oral
administration).69
The second route is by submitting a second Art. 8(3) MA. A study that assessed
the number of filings by both routes shows that the ratio of times a drug is
repositioned via the first route (by amending an extant authorisation) compared to
the second route (filing another application under Art. 8(3)) is between 60:1 and
10:1.70 One reason for the wide range is that in some situations it can be difficult to
distinguish between a drug being repositioned by a second application under Art.
8(3), and a ‘‘new active substance’’, which does not qualify as repositioning for the
purposes of the ?1.71 Sometimes two Art. 8(3) MAs appear to be for the same drug
because they use the same or similar active ingredient (e.g. salts, polymorphs),
which indicates repositioning, but the active ingredients might differ in subtle yet
important ways that affect safety or efficacy. If the safety or efficacy is
‘‘significantly different’’ then the EMA classifies the second compound as a ‘‘new
68 European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency Post-authorisation Procedural Advice for
Users of the Centralised Procedure (2021), p. 126.
69 European Medicines Agency, Extensions of Marketing Authorisations: Questions and Answers (n.d.);
European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency Post-authorisation Procedural Advice for
Users of the Centralised Procedure (2021), p. 41.
70 Balogh (2016), pp. 12–13.
71 European Commission (2015), pp. 9–10, 43.
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active substance’’.72 The EMA now records whether a drug is a new active
substance in all Art. 8(3) MAs, but this was not always the case.73 This study
analysed repositioning via the first route only for two reasons. First, it is much more
common and, second, repositioning is difficult to identify under Art. 8(3) when not
labelled by the EMA.
The method to collate all the repositioned drugs consisted of several steps. The
EMA maintains a database of all medicines it authorises,74 including veterinary
drugs and generics. This database was downloaded on 3 July 2019, containing 1,565
products. Only drugs with Art. 8(3) MAs are eligible for the ?1,75 therefore, only
drugs authorised under this or the equivalent antecedent process, Art. 4 of Directive
65/65, were retained in the database for this study.76 Various other types of products
were removed,77 including veterinary medicines, generics, biosimilars, ‘‘hybrid
medicines’’,78 and combinations of known drugs.79 Diagnostics and radiopharma-
ceutical precursors were also removed because they are not drugs.
This study also removed duplicate drug authorisations because their inclusion
may bias the results. For this project, duplicate entries were defined as drugs that
had the same: (i) anatomical therapeutic chemical classification code (a system
maintained by the World Health Organisation to classify drugs);80 (ii) active
substance; (iii) medical indication; and (iv) were submitted or authorised within two
weeks of each other.
The removed products totalled 823, leaving 742 drugs authorised under Art. 8(3)
or Art. 4 of Directive 65/65.
3.2 Dates and Information on Repositioned Indications
The EMA database, at download, included the primary MA dates for each drug but
not the dates the applications for primary MA were submitted (submission dates).
Submission dates are important to this study because they, amongst other criteria,
72 European Commission (2015), p. 48.
73 Balogh (2016), pp. 12–13.
74 European Medicines Agency, Download Medicine Data (n.d.); Regulation 2309/1993 laying down
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and
veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products [1993] OJ
L214/1.
75 Regulation 726/2004, Art. 14(1). Note: drugs that must be authorised through the centralised procedure
expanded when Regulation 726/2004 replaced Regulation 2309/1993. Regulation 2309/1993, Art. 3(1)
(via the Annex), specified that the centralised procedure was mandatory for drugs made by
biotechnologies processes only, and Regulation 726/04, Art. 3(1) (via the Annex), added drugs that
treat cancer, diabetes, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and diabetes. This list was further
expanded on 20 May 2008 to include auto-immune disease and other immune dysfunctions as well as
viral diseases. To the authors’ knowledge there is no reason to expect that this change in drugs that must
be authorised through the centralised procedure should lead to more or less repositioning.
76 Directive 65/65, Art. 4.
77 A similar method was adopted in Langedijk et al. (2016), p. 349.
78 European Medicines Agency, Generic and Hybrid Medicines (n.d.).
79 Directive (2001/83), Art. 10(b).
80 World Health Organisation (2018).
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determine whether a drug is eligible for the ?1 (drugs are only eligible for the ?1 if
the Art. 8(3) MA application was submitted after 20 November 2005). The EMA
publishes a European Public Access Report (EPAR) for each drug that it grants or
refuses an MA,81 and all EPARs now include submission dates for primary MAs.
However, submission dates have not always been included, especially for drugs
authorised before 2000.
On 27 occasions a submission date was not recorded in an EPAR, so validation
dates were used instead. The EMA validates MA applications after confirming that
all the necessary information is included for evaluation and normally occurs in
approximately 13 days.82 This study obtained the validation dates from the EMA’s
annual reports.83 The use of validation dates instead of the submission dates could
incorrectly label a drug as eligible for the ?1. This could occur if the application
was submitted before 20 November 2005 and validated after 20 November 2005.
However, none of the validation dates used were after 20 November 2005, which
means no drugs were incorrectly labelled as eligible for the ?1. The submission and
primary MA dates of the 742 drugs are represented in Fig. 1.84
The database downloaded from the EMA contained no specific information about
repositioning. Consequently, data on repositioning were collected from the EPARs.85
Various details of the repositioned indications were collected, including the new
indication,86 whether it was authorised, whether the applicant applied for the?1, and
the date the European Commission (on advice from the EMA)87 authorised the
repositioned indication. The data collection concluded on 20 August 2019.
Figure 1 shows ‘‘first repositioning’’ over time. This term refers to the first time
the Commission authorised an expansion of the drug’s indication. Figure 1 shows
that there has been a general increase in first repositioning over time, meaning the
absolute number of drugs repositioned by the MAHs has increased. However, since
81 European Medicines Agency, European Public Assessment Reports: Background and Context (n.d.).
82 European Medicines Agency (2017), p. 4.
83 European Medicines Agency, Annual Reports and Work Programmes (n.d.).
84 The EMA was not formally operating until 10 February 1995, yet three EPARs state that drugs were
submitted before this date. We expect this occurred because pharmaceutical companies knew the EMA
was near operating and wanted to take advantage of the central authorisation process. It also occurred
during a time when all the EMA’s procedures were still being developed. For simplicity and convenience,
these applications were listed in the database as submitted on 10 February 1995.
85 EPARs typically contain similar documents, although the labels and contents have changed over time.
The first documents examined were summaries of changes to the drug, these were usually titled
‘‘procedural steps taken and scientific information after the authorisation’’, which were found in the
section of the EPAR titled ‘‘overview of procedural steps taken before and after authorisation’’. The
summary documents were read for references to ‘‘variations’’, ‘‘indications’’, ‘‘extensions’’ and ‘‘C.I.6.a’’,
which is the classification used by the EMA for additional indications or modifications to existing
indications. The relevant variation assessment reports and scientific discussions were then consulted for
the details of the repositioning. If the summary documents were unavailable or only covered a limited
time period, then all ‘‘assessment reports’’ and ‘‘scientific discussions’’ outside the summary documents
were examined.
86 Not all type-II variations are extensions of indication; for example, some restricted the indication, see
European Medicines Agency (2021), p. 126. It should be noted that on three occasions EMA documents
described an extension of indication but did not disclose how the indication expanded.
87 European Medicines Agency, European Commission Decision.
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the number of primary MAs has increased as well, Fig. 1 does not show whether the
proportion of drugs repositioned by MAHs or the number of times drugs are
repositioned by MAHs has increased.
In 2010, the number of Art. 8(3) applications dropped steeply. This could be
due to the global financial crises in 2007 and 2008. That said, some data refute
that the crises influenced activity inordinately. For instance, Art. 8(3) submissions
and first repositioning activity were relatively high in 2009. Further, 2010 was not
the only year to experience marked drops in MAs or submissions: similar drops
were observed in 2003 and 2016–17. This suggests that the 2007–2008 crises
impacted activity in a similar manner to events in other years. Nevertheless, any
conclusions drawn by this study should bear the crisis as well as other events like
this in mind.
3.3 Untangling the Effects of the Paediatric Regulation
The ?1 is not the only EU regulatory law that encourages repositioning. Regulation
1901/2006,88 the ‘‘Paediatric Regulation’’, was passed with the primary goal of
increasing the number of drugs authorised to treat children.89 The Regulation
achieves this goal through Arts. 7 and 8, which oblige organisations to carry out
paediatric investigations in certain circumstances. The Regulation rewards the
completion of these investigations with a six-month extension of the MAHs’
Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs).90 SPCs extend patent rights to offset
the time it takes for MAHs to complete clinical trials and reach market.91
Fig. 1 Graphic representation of: primary MA submissions, primary MA dates and ‘‘first repositioning’’
(the first time a drug is repositioned by the MAH). All categories fluctuate but increase over time. (This
figure includes repositioning via deferred PIP data; see below for an explanation)
88 Regulation 1901/2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use [2004] OJ L378/1.
89 European Commission (2017), p. 5.
90 Regulation (1901/2006), Art. 36(1).
91 Regulation 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products
[2009] OJ L151/1; European Commission, Supplementary Protection Certificates for Pharmaceutical and
Plant Protection Products (n.d).
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Commencing on 26 July 2008, Art. 7 concerns Art. 8(3) applications,92 while Art. 8
commenced on 26 January 2009 and deals with applications for new indications (i.e.
applications to reposition a drug).93
To meet the requirements of Arts. 7 and 8, the results of a Paediatric
Investigation Plan (PIP) are typically required, which usually include paediatric
clinical trial data.94 However, exceptions exist. In the case of Art. 8 and applications
for new indications, the results of a PIP are required only if the drug is protected by
an SPC or a patent that qualifies for one,95 and for both Arts. 7 and 8, the EMA can
grant a waiver;96 for example, if the drug treats a disease that does not afflict
children. Furthermore, the EMA can grant a deferral, which means the MAH must
provide the results of the PIP at a later date.97 Deferrals are frequently granted
because recruiting children for clinical trials is time-consuming. Without permission
to defer, a drug’s MA could be delayed with consequent problems for non-paediatric
patients.98
The Paediatric Regulation is relevant to this study because deferrals raise the
possibility that a drug will be repositioned for a paediatric cohort at a later date. This
means that, in certain circumstances, the Paediatric Regulation drives repositioning,
rather than the ?1.
This study evaluated the impact of Arts. 7 and 8 on repositioning. The effect of
Art. 7 was examined by analysing the repositioning of drugs submitted for primary
MAs after 26 July 2008. Five drugs were found that were repositioned for a
paediatric cohort pursuant to a PIP based on a deferral to a primary MA. The effect
of Art. 8 was examined by analysing all repositioning after 26 January 2009. Ten
drugs were found that were repositioned for a paediatric cohort pursuant to a PIP
based on a deferral to an application for a new indication, and for two of these drugs
this occurred twice. These instances of deferral-related repositioning are discussed
in the context of other data below.
As mentioned, the Paediatric Regulation not only requires paediatric investiga-
tions, but also rewards the completion of the PIP. If the drug is protected by an SPC
or a patent that qualifies for an SPC, the MAH is entitled to a six-month SPC
extension. However, if an MAH obtains a ?1, then it is precluded from obtaining
the six-month SPC extension.99 None of the MAHs that repositioned drugs pursuant
to a PIP in this study applied for the ?1.
92 Regulation (1901/2006), Art. 5(2).
93 Regulation (1901/2006), Art. 5(2).
94 Regulation (1901/2006), Art. 7; European Commission (2017), p. 20.
95 Regulation (1901/2006), Art. 8.
96 Regulation (1901/2006), Arts. 7(b)–(c), 8 and 11.
97 Regulation (1901/2006), Arts. 7(d), 8, 20 and 21.
98 European Commission (2017), pp. 9, 20.
99 Regulation (1901/2006), Art. 36(5).
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4 Data on the Proportion of Repositioned Drugs and the Number of Times
Drugs Were Repositioned
This study aimed to evaluate two ways the ?1 might have increased repositioning
activity. First, this study investigated whether the ?1 increased the proportion of
drugs repositioned by MAHs; Table 1 shows these results. Second, this study
investigated whether the number of times drugs were repositioned by MAHs
increased; Table 3 shows these results. Furthermore, this study tracked the instances
that MAHs applied for the ?1 in the dataset. The EMA granted 14 applications for
the ?1 and refused five, while an MAH withdrew another.
The layout of Tables 1, 2 and 3 reflect the two time-based criteria to obtain the
?1. All three tables are divided into time frames based on primary MA submission
dates. Submission dates are used because one of the criteria for the ?1 is that only
drugs submitted for an MA after 20 November 2005 are eligible. Tables 1 and 3 use
two time frames, ‘‘before the ?1 came into effect’’ and ‘‘after the ?1 came into
effect’’. This means that the 256 drugs that received primary MAs in the first row of
Table 1 all had submission dates before 20 November 2005 (even though some were
authorised and repositioned after this date). A second criterion for the ?1 is that the
MAH must reposition the drug within eight years of the primary MA. This criterion
was applied to all drugs in this study, not just those with submission dates for
primary MAs after 20 November 2005. The application of the eight-year criterion to
all drugs in this study enables an assessment of whether the ?1 increased
repositioning.
Table 1 shows that 42.2% of drugs (108/256) were repositioned by MAHs before
the ?1 came into effect, compared with 42.4% (56/125) after. The bracketed
numbers in Table 1 refer to values if drugs repositioned pursuant to a PIP are
included. These results nominally indicate that the ?1 increased the proportion of
repositioned drugs by 0.2%, however, this equates to no ‘‘extra’’ repositioned drugs
or effectively the same amount of repositioning. The 0.2% difference is not
Table 1 Comparison of the proportion of repositioned drugs by MAHs before and after the?1 came into
effect, showing an increase of 0.2% after the law came into effect





# of Drugs repositioned within
eight years of the primary MAs
%
Repositioned
Before the ?1 came into effect
(1 Jan 1995 to 20 Nov 2005)
256 108 (108) 42.2 (42.2)
After the ?1 came into effect 21
Nov 2005 to 31 Dec 2010
125 53 (58) 42.4 (46.4)
The bracketed numbers are the values if repositioning via deferred PIP data is included
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statistically significant,100 though it should be noted that the sample size in this
study could only show statistical significance if a 16.2% increase was observed,
Table 2 Proportion of repositioned drugs by submission year (excluding repositioned drugs via deferred
PIP data), showing a low of 21.4% in 1996 and a high of 63.0% in 2004
Year of primary MA
submissions
# of Drugs receiving
primary MAs
# of Drugs repositioned within eight
years of the primary MAs
%
Repositioned
1995 21 12 57.1
1996 14 3 21.4
1997 26 9 34.6
1998 25 10 40.0
1999 31 13 41.9
2000 21 6 28.6
2001 27 11 40.7
2002 18 8 44.4
2003 25 13 52.0
2004 27 17 63.0
2005* 21 6 28.6
2006* 44 22 50.0
2007 33 13 39.4
2008 33 14 42.4
2009** 15 4 26.7
Drugs submitted for primary MAs in 2006 or later were eligible for the ?1 (marked by the single
horizontal line)
Table 3 Comparison of the number of times drugs are repositioned before and after the ?1 came into
effect, showing an average decrease of 0.1 after the law came into effect
Time frames of primary
MA submissions
# of Drugs repositioned
within eight years of the
primary MAs
Total # of times the drugs were
repositioned within eight years




Before the ?1 came into
effect (1 Jan 1995 to
20 Nov 2005)
108 215 (215) 2.0 (2.0)
After the ?1 came into
effect 21 Nov 2005 to
31 Dec 2010
53 (58) 99 (116) 1.9 (2.0)
The bracketed numbers are the values if repositioning via deferred PIP data is included
100 McDonald (2014). Fisher’s exact test shows that the differences in proportions in Table 1 are not
statistically different (p[ 0.10). The p value is 1.00 when repositioning via deferred PIP data is excluded,
and 0.62 when repositioning via deferred PIP data is included. The statistical tests were performed using
an online calculator: ‘‘Easy Fisher Exact Test Calculator’’ (n.d.), https://www.socscistatistics.com/tests/
fisher/default2.aspx (accessed 10 December 2020).
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which equates to 73 of 125 drugs in the ‘‘after’’ cohort being repositioned. Thus,
statistical tests offer limited insight into this analysis.
Table 2 offers finer-grained detail than Table 1 by separating the data into
individual years. That said, Table 2 also contains two minor exceptions to this
separation. First, four drugs had submission dates in 2005 after 20 November.
Table 2 groups these drugs with the drugs submitted in 2006; otherwise the entry for
2005 would include drugs that were both eligible and ineligible for the ?1. Second,
two drugs in this study were submitted for primary MAs in 2010 and then authorised
in the same year. This occurred because the EMA takes time to authorise drugs, and
most drugs submitted in 2010 were authorised in 2011 (as mentioned, drugs
authorised in 2011 or later were excluded from this study because the eight-year
period for MAHs to obtain the ?1 had not elapsed before this study began). Table 2
groups these two drugs with the drugs submitted for primary authorisations in 2009,
otherwise the entry for 2010 would only have two drugs, and this would
inaccurately represent repositioning activity. Reminders of these two exceptions are
represented in Table 2 with asterisks (one for the first exception and two for the
second). These exceptions make it easier to analyse whether the ?1 increased the
proportion of drugs repositioned by MAHs; the drugs submitted for primary MAs
before the horizontal line (1995–2005) were not eligible for the ?1, but the drugs
after the horizontal line (2006–2009) were.
One insight from Table 2 can be obtained by comparing the four years
immediately before the ?1 came into effect with the four years after. This
assessment is useful because the comparison is between similar eras of scientific
understanding. From 2002 to 2005, 91 drugs were authorised and 44 (48.4%) of
them were repositioned. The four years afterwards are already calculated in Table 1
(42.4%). This comparison indicates that after the ?1 came into effect, the
proportion of repositioned drugs decreased by 6.0% (a difference of approximately
seven drugs). If drugs repositioned via deferred PIPs are included in this analysis
(46.4%), then there was still a decrease of 2% (approximately two drugs) in the four
years after the ?1 came into effect.
The decrease of 6.0% could be linked to the difficulties obtaining patents
described in the Background; but no data in this study support that conclusion. Data
that would indicate difficulties obtaining patents include sustained periods of
decreasing repositioning, which is not evidenced in the data. An alternative
explanation is that the four years before the ?1 came into effect witnessed a short-
term increase in repositioning and that the years afterwards reverted to the mean.
This explanation is more likely as it aligns with the data and with a 2004
commentary that described a ‘‘boom’’ in repositioning.101
A question remains about whether drugs repositiond via deferred PIPs would
have occurred if the Paediatric Regulation did not exist and, therefore, should be
counted with all the other repositioning in the ‘‘after’’ cohort. The EMA’s 10-year
review of the Paediatric Regulation shows that the Regulation has significantly
101 Ashburn and Thor (2004), p. 682.
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increased the number of MAs with paediatric indications and the number of type-II
variations for paedatric cohorts.102 These increases suggest that much of the
repositioning can be attributed to the Regulation, but exactly how much remains
uncertain. None of the repositioning via deferred PIPs in this study applied for the
?1, which indicates that the ?1 did not drive the paediatric repositioning. On
balance, then, excluding this repositioning via deferred PIP data seems sensible.
However, even if all five extra drugs repositioned by deferred PIP data were
included in the ‘‘after’’ cohort, it would have been challenging to conclude that the
?1 increased repositioning for three reasons. First, repositioning in the four years
before the ?1 came into effect would still have been higher. Second, the result
would not be statistically significant; and third, which is related to the second, the
extra five drugs could be attributed to year-to-year variation in repositioning, which
ranges from 21.4% (3/14) to 63.0% (17/27).
This study is limited by the sample size of drugs that received primary MAs. One
response to the size of the dataset is to conduct a follow-on study in another five to
10 years, which would likely double or triple the number of drugs that received
primary MAs in the ‘‘after’’ cohort. Larger datasets typically provide more
precision, and such datasets might even permit researchers to look for statistical
differences in the repositioning of different classes of drugs (e.g. orphan drugs and
biologics). However, a problem with incorporating data from later years is that
scientific and medical environments rapidly change. These changes mean that any
comparisons would be between years with increasingly different scientific and
regulatory environments.103
This paper now turns to whether the ?1 increased the number of times drugs
were repositioned by the MAHs. As mentioned, drugs are often repositioned more
than once, but the ?1 can only be obtained once. Table 3 follows the same layout as
Tables 1 and 2, orientated around submission dates of primary MA applications.
Table 3 shows that if a drug was repositioned then, on average, it was repositioned
2.0 times before ?1 came into effect. Table 3 also shows that this number decreased
to 1.9 in the ‘‘after’’ cohort. The numbers in Table 3 have been rounded for
convenience, and the 0.1 difference equates to a difference of seven fewer times that
drugs were repositioned. This result is not statistically significant,104 but it should be
noted that the sample size in this study could only show statistical significance if the
‘‘after’’ average fell to approximately 1.4. Thus, statistical tests offer limited insight
into this analysis too.
The decrease in Table 3 could be linked to the ?1, if the law encouraged MAHs
to reposition their drug once and not pursue additional repositioning. However, the
proportion of drugs in the ‘‘before’’ cohort that were repositioned once is 52.7% (57/
108) compared to the 54.7% (30/53) in the ‘‘after’’ cohort, a difference that is not
102 European Medicines Agency (2016), pp. 12–13.
103 See e.g. Feldman (2018), pp. 617–637; Breckenridge (2018), p. 4.
104 McDonald (2015). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that the differences in proportions in Table 3
are not statistically different (p[ 0.10). The p value is 0.96 when repositioning via deferred PIP data is
excluded, and 0.73 when repositioning via deferred PIP data is included. The statistical tests were
performed using an online calculator: ‘‘Mann-Whitney U Test Calculator’’ (n.d.), https://www.
socscistatistics.com/tests/mannwhitney/default2.aspx (accessed 10 December 2020).
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large enough to explain the decrease. Instead, a close look at the number of times
certain drugs were authorised suggests a simpler explanation.
The drugs Remicade and Humira were repositioned nine times each, and the
drugs Avastin and Glivec were repositioned eight times each. All four were
submitted for primary authorisation before 20 November 2005, meaning they were
not eligible for the ?1. In comparison, no drugs submitted after 20 November 2005
were repositioned six times or more. If two or three drugs submitted after
20 November 2005 were repositioned eight or nine times, then these numbers would
look similar. Consequently, the 0.1 difference observed in Table 3 can be attributed
to sample size and the variation in repositioning; that is, if the ‘‘after’’ sample
included more drugs, then these averages would probably be closer, as a larger
number of drugs would mean there is a greater chance one or two would be
repositioned eight or nine times.
5 Policy Implications
5.1 Do the Results Indicate the ?1 Increased Repositioning?
The short answer to this question is ‘‘no’’. To recap, Table 1 effectively shows the
same proportion of repositioned drugs before and after the ?1 came into effect. The
results on the number of times drugs are repositioned tell a similar story. Table 3
shows that if a drug was repositioned, then the average number of times it was
repositioned decreased from 2.0 to 1.9, which is a difference of about seven times
drugs were repositioned. This decrease can be explained by drugs in the data that
were repositioned six times or more before the ?1 came into effect and that no
drugs have been repositioned six or more times after. Thus, this difference is likely
due to year-to-year variation.
The conclusion that the ?1 did not increase the proportion of drugs that were
repositioned by MAHs or the number of times drugs were repositioned by MAHs
stands even if drugs repositioned based on PIP-deferred data are included in the
analysis. (Initially, these drugs were excluded because their existence is arguably
owed more to the effect of the Paediatric Regulation than the ?1.) The proportion of
repositioned drugs including PIP-based repositioning was 46.4%, which is 2% lower
than the proportion in the four years before the ?1 came into effect. And the
average number of times drugs were repositioned including PIP-based repositioning
was 2.0; which is no change from the average before the ?1 came into effect.
A further point to consider is whether the ?1 averted a decrease in repositioning
activity. In this case, one could argue that the ?1 increased repositioning, although
the amount of repositioning seems unchanged. As noted, MAHs made 20
applications for the ?1 (14 that were successful and six that were not). Perhaps
this repositioning would not have occurred if the ?1 did not exist? This study does
not rule this possibility out; however, the data in this study do not support this
interpretation. For instance, Table 2 does not show any sustained decrease in the
proportion of repositioned drugs before the ?1 came into effect, with a surge after
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the ?1 was available. Thus, there are no data in this study to conclude the ?1
averted a decrease in repositioning.
If it is correct that the ?1 did not increase repositioning, then this outcome likely
has significant implications for drug prices. The failure of the ?1 to increase
repositioning means that most, if not all, of the repositioning observed in the study
would have occurred if the ?1 did not exist. Consequently, the 14 MAHs that
received an additional year of market exclusivity likely cost EEA governments and
patients millions of euros in higher prices.
5.2 Reasons the ?1 Had No Effect
Four reasons potentially explain why the ?1 had no impact on repositioning
activity. The first reason relates to how the ?1 fits alongside patents in IP strategies.
The ?1 might be valuable in some situations, for example, where the MAH lacks
patent protection. However, in many other scenarios, the ?1 will be eclipsed by a
patent or other rights. For example, MAHs often own a patent protecting the drug
compound, which does not suffer the same problems as second medical use
patents,105 and which has a lifespan of 20 years from the date of filing.106 This
means that 11 years of market protection from the primary MA may be redundant
because the 20-year patent term is longer. In addition, MAHs often obtain other
complementary forms of IP. For instance, many MAHs extend their patent
protection by up to five years with an SPC.107 MAHs can also obtain secondary
patents, for example, for second medical uses, improvements to the drug (such as on
mechanisms of delivery or refinements to the molecule), or use of the drug with
medical devices (e.g. diagnostics).108 Thus, although the ?1 may be useful in some
circumstances, in many other situations it is likely redundant.
The second reason is that society might already be seeing high rates of
repositioning by MAHs and expecting more is akin to hoping for a bottomless well.
The last four years of data in this study (2005–2009) show that 42.4% of drugs, or
over four in ten drugs, were repositioned. How much more repositioning by MAHs
can plausibly be expected? The issue here is that the ?1 incentive may be futile.
The third reason is that the eligibility rules for the ?1 might be problematic. For
instance, the rule that repositioning must occur within eight years of marketing
authorisation. The problem is that many indications emerge only serendipitously
after years of research and clinical use,109 and assembling the requisite data to
submit to the EMA takes even longer. This might mean the MAHs cannot meet the
eight-year rule, curbing the effect of the ?1. If this is the reason, the ?1 incentive is
arguably inapt.
Another way in which the eligibility rules for the ?1 might be inapt is the
requirement that the new indication provide significant clinical benefit compared
105 Kapczynski et al. (2012), pp. 4, 6.
106 European Patent Convention (1973), Art. 63(1).
107 Regulation 469/2009, Art. 13(2).
108 Beall and Kesselheim (2018), p. 142.
109 Polamreddy and Gattu (2018), p. 789.
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with existing therapies. Arguably, this condition is too demanding and dissuades
MAHs from pursuing the ?1. However, in this study, 73.6% (14/19) of the
applications for the ?1 passed the threshold (the one remaining application was
withdrawn before it was evaluated because the MAH obtained the ?1 for the drug
via other repositioning). This relatively high success rate suggests that the
‘‘significant clinical benefit’’ threshold is not the reason for the ?1 having limited
impact on repositioning activity.
The fourth reason concerns the value of the ?1. Arguably, the extra year is
insufficient. Even in circumstances where the ?1 offers useful protection, the
financial value of a single extra year might not outweigh the research costs.
Although the ?1 provides market protection for both the old and the new
indications,110 the research costs include both actual and opportunity costs, and
MAHs might decide that other projects in their pipelines present more lucrative
opportunities.
A further issue is that cross-label use of a generic might reduce financial returns.
However, cross-label use is not a given, as several strategies can limit or avoid it;
for example, MAHs can sometimes change the dose, formulation or route of
administration of the drug.111 Moreover, if an MA is for a new active substance,
then the MAH is unlikely to encounter any cross-label use until the 11 years of
market protection lapses; this occurs because market protection stops generics from
being marketed. In 2019, 84.2% of Art. 8(3) MAs were for new active
substances.112 Consequently, whether the value of the ?1 is insufficient is a
complex issue that warrants considerably more study.
5.3 The Future of the ?1
This study indicates that the ?1 did not increase the proportion of drugs
repositioned by MAHs nor the number of times drugs were repositioned by MAHs.
But, as discussed in the previous section, there are at least four possible reasons why
the ?1 failed to have these effects. The ?1 might be redundant, futile, inapt or
insufficient. Without knowing more about these reasons, one cannot conclude
whether the ?1 should be amended or even repealed.
Useful information could be obtained through comparative research with US
legislation. US law provides a period of exclusivity for new medical indications,
however, the scope and duration of the protection differ from the European
approach. For example, the US provides three years of protection, and the protection
takes the form of preventing approvals for the new indication only (not market
protection for all the MAH’s indications).113 Additionally, US law allows
applications to be made by any party at any time after the primary MA (there is
110 Directive (2001/83), Art. 6(1); Riberio (2018), p. 6; European Commission (2015), pp. 9–10, 43.
111 Phelps (2012), pp. 82–83; Frail (2012), pp. 396–399; Persidis and Stark (2012), pp. 436–437. See also
Apotex Pty Ltd v AstraZeneca AB [No 4] (2013) 100 I.P.R. 285 at 411; for a review of this litigation, see
Liddicoat (2015), pp. 175–6.
112 European Medicines Agency (2020).
113 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2), 355(c)(3)(E)((iii)–(iv), 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv).
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no eight-year time limit), and there is no requirement to prove significant clinical
benefit. The only requirement is that the application includes ‘‘essential’’ new
clinical investigations that support the authorisation of the new indication.114
Research similar to this study could investigate whether the US approach has been
effective. If so, it might suggest that the ?1 should be amended so that it is more
effective.
Another line of research would be to interview or survey scientific researchers in
industry and academia. Respondents could be asked whether they discontinued a
repositioning project and, if so, why. Was it because there was insufficient market
exclusivity, or was it due to other factors such as too much uncertainty about the
science or other more pressing research goals?
If evidence emerges that the ?1 failed to incentivise repositioning because it is
too short, several lines of research should be pursued before it is lengthened.
Research would be needed to investigate the duration needed to spur more
repositioning. Research should also calculate the financial cost of additional
exclusivity. Exclusivity affects competitive pricing, and so the costs must not
outweigh the added utility of the new indication. In addition, research could provide
a more fine-grained analysis of whether certain classes of repositioning should be
excluded from obtaining the ?1. For example, a close inspection of repositioning
before the ?1 came into effect might reveal classes of repositioning that will
reliably occur without offering extra market protection.
If further research shows no reason to extend the ?1, then we should consider
repealing the incentive. This study indicates that the ?1 not only failed to increase
repositioning, but that it imposes a cost on society for no benefit, or, in other words,
a deadweight loss. To recap, this study found 14 instances where MAHs
successfully obtained the ?1. These MAHs received an additional year of market
exclusivity for all the authorised uses of their drug (the old as well as the new).
Therefore, the ?1 likely prevented competitive pricing for an extra year, meaning
governments and patients had to pay higher prices. Although this study indicates
that the ?1 failed to increase repositioning, the results do not rule out the possibility
that the ?1 averted a decrease in activity. Additional research could confirm
whether the MAHs that received the ?1 are deadweight losses. If the ?1 has only
created deadweight losses, it should be repealed. Alternatively, if this research
shows that it is a useful incentive in some situations but generally redundant or
futile, then reform might be required. However, this reform would depend on
exactly what the research shows.
6 Conclusion
This study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of the ?1 by assembling and
analysing all the relevant instances of repositioning before and after the exclusivity
came into effect. It also sought to capture important ancillary data on drugs
repositioned by MAHs since the establishment of the EMA. The results show that
114 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2), 355(c)(3)(E)((iii)–(iv), 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv).
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there was a substantial level of repositioning activity before the ?1 came into effect;
notably, 42.2% of MAHs repositioned their drugs. The results show that the
proportion of MAHs that repositioned their drugs after the ?1 did not increase. The
results also show that the average number of times drugs were repositioned by
MAHs decreased, but that this was probably due to random variation in
repositioning activity. Consequently, this study concludes that the ?1 failed to
increase repositioning.
Four reasons potentially explain why the ?1 failed to increase repositioning: (i) it
is redundant due to other IP; (ii) it is futile because MAHs are already pursuing all
promising repositioning projects; (iii) it is in inapt due to its eligibility criteria; and
(iv) it is insufficient because one extra year of market protection may not outweigh
the costs of the additional research.
Three reform options are to lengthen the ?1, repeal it or keep it in its current
state. Commentators have suggested lengthening the ?1 to increase the incentive
for repositioning. This study indicates that this is not advisable unless further
evidence emerges. The ?1 may have failed to increase repositioning because a
single extra year of exclusivity was insufficient. It is also possible that the ?1
averted a decrease in repositioning, and that the ?1 is now needed to sustain the
current levels of repositioning. Repealing the ?1 is a plausible option, but research
should first examine the ?1’s role in sustaining levels of repositioning and
investigate whether the MAHs that obtained the ?1 are deadweight losses.
Consequently, this study suggests we should keep the ?1 in its current state for the
moment.
Only rarely do individual studies guide policy reform exactly, and this study is no
exception. Nevertheless, this study takes the first step towards a comprehensive
evidence-based policy for the ?1.
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